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Labour relations in South Africa, particularly as they
involve black workers are never likely to be free of a variety of 
influences from the social and political environment. In industrial 
relations circles this simple fact is often the subject of speculation 
but seldom is it included in any systematic debate or analysis. This 
is understandable because the number of factors involved is so large 
and the nature of these factors is often so subtle as to make any systematic 
analysis very difficult indeed. The importance of such an analysis, 
however, goes almost without saying, and for this reason a brief and 
very broad orientation to the subject will be attempted in this paper.
1. Industrial Relations in Political Life
industry in South Africa in at least four different ways:
1.1 Any political disturbances on a substantial scale an ’ " J ' e
evidence which shows just how seriously the economic cycle was 
disrupted by the 1976 disturbances, having the effect of deepening 
the subsequent recession quite markedly.
1.2 One must assume that political attitudes and sentiments can affect 
the industrial commitment of black employees. When black employees 
as a group are concerned with industrial progress and material 
advancement one may speak very broadly of industrial commitment. 
Industrial commitment is not fully developed among all black workers 
in South African industry. There is still a proportion of black 
workers, which is shrinking by the year, in which one finds some 
evidence of a withdrawal of labour in order to enjoy leisure or 
to pursue rural agricultural commitments. Among a clear majority, 
however, the commitment to urban or industrial work is a life-long 
commitment with the goal of individual, material and occupational 
advancement. This kind of commitment, which is wellnigh 
universal in industrial society, is a stabilising factor at a very 
basic level in industrial relations. To put it very simply, it means 
that labour withdrawal in the form of strikes or stoppages, are reduced
1) Brian Kantor, "Prospects for the South African Economy: A Comparison
of Costs and Returns", Mobil Senior Management Seminar 7-9 November,
1982, Cape Town.
Political and community issues among blacks can affect
an incisive effect on business confidence. Kantor
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to the minimum necessary to secure a concrete objective. Only 
if any qualitatively different motivation emerges could one 
expect strikes and stoppages to continue beyond the attainment 
or possibility of attainment of some fairly specific material 
or labour relations objective.
It is possible to conceive of a situation in which political 
sentiments and commitments so influence the attitudes of black 
industrial workers that the occupational or material commitments 
of workers become replaced by very much broader and more diffuse 
political objectives. In such a case then none of the normal 
“rules" of industrial relations are likely to apply. There is 
little or no evidence of this having occurred or being likely to 
occur at the present time but it certainly cannot be regarded as 
an impossible scenario. This has happened on a fairly large 
scale in the distant past, when in early Natal one found a great 
deal of resistance among Zulus to working for whites and there 
was a similar pattern in the resistance among the Sekhekunes in 
the Transvaal in the earlier part of this century. Admittedly 
these were not industrial workers but people living in a tribal 
economy which was much more viable than any tribal economy is 
today, but the example at least illustrates the kind of alienation 
that can occur.
1.3 The most immediate and likely effect of political life on industry 
is likely to be found in the consequences of more specific 
community grievances. Here one may think of the fairly wide­
spread grievances in regard to. transport, housing shortages, hosti1ity 
to the regimentation by the authorities in the typical township, and 
the discomforts of hostel life among migrant workers. Such grievances 
can have a direct effect in the sense of producing a high level of 
frustration among employees which may make them more sensitive to 
issues in the workplace than they might otherwise be. There 
is, however, a less direct but equally meaningful possible affect.
People generally work in order to "translate" the rewards of work
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in the form of wages and occupational status into an improved 
domestic quality of life. Wages and salaries are invested in 
housing, private transport, recreation, and a variety of home 
comforts, and the occupational status which an employee enjoys 
finds an echo in the status which he or she enjoys in the community.
If, however, conditions and opportunities in the community are 
so bad that there is very little scope for an improved quality of 
life then work benefits cannot be translated into an improved 
quality of life. Fairly automatically, then, the motivation 
of employees to improve their occupational rewards is undermined. 
Perhaps the most serious of these limitations lies in the field 
of housing. Today there is a shortage of housing which is 
estimated to be close to 600 000 units in black urban areas.
(Schlemmer and Moller, 1982.)^ This inevitably means a very 
substantial proportion of black industrial workers may have 
given up any hope of ever owning a house in a township. The 
affects of this limitation on their commitment to industrial 
progress must be very pervasive indeed.
1.4 Finally one may argue that the political climate affects industrial 
relations through its influence on the degree of "trust" which 
black workers have of this system in which they work. Recently 
there were widespread "pension strikes" in Natal and the Eastern 
Cape, and one of the factors underlying these strikes was the 
lack of trust in the pension funds and a great deal of uncertainty 
about what the state was doing with the proportion of pension 
fund money which by law has to be invested in government stock.
This is perhaps the most dramatic example available of how a lack 
of trust can produce repercussions of a serious nature for industry. 
There are other institutions besides pension funds which could be 
relevant in this context: unemployment insurance funds, industrial
councils, the industrial courts, the machinery for workmens' 
compensation and a host of other major and minor institutions which can 
all have an affect on the climate of industrial relations.
1) L. Schlemmer and V. Moller, "Black Housing in South Africa", in 
Energos, 1982 Seven, published for the Public Affairs Department 
of Mobil Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd by Aviation Publications (Pty)
Ltd.
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2. POLITICAL EFFECTS IN INDUSTRY - THE UNCERTAINTIES
Moving among businessmen as a collectivity one becomes 
aware of a great deal of uncertainty about the implications of black 
political thinking for commerce and industry. Some businessmen, 
for example, tend to assume that political factors are strongly 
present in labour disputes and black trade union development. Others 
again define the major dynamic as being material factors or grievances 
of a much more specific kind.
It is not uncommon to hear some employers assume that a wide 
distinction exists between developments in black politics or black 
community affairs on the one hand, and the sphere of black labour on 
the other. Certain observations would tend to support this view.
One may point, for example, to the fact that during the 1976 
disturbances in Soweto and other black townships, the successive 
calls for stay-away strikes met with a doubtful response from black 
employees. Reports indicated that while the first three calls for 
sympathy stay-aways were between 50 and 70 percent successful , 
later calls for strikes were notably unsuccessful, perhaps because 
of a tougher attitude to absenteeism on the part of Johannesburg 
employers. It is broadly true to say that the township disturbances 
did not spread to or generalise into industrial action on any massive 
scale. The authorities, furthermore, tended to take the view 
that the response which did occur was due to coercion of workers and 
not to willing co-operation with the youthful demonstrators. Widely 
reported attacks by hostel dwellers on the township youth both in 
Soweto and Cape Town reinforced this view.
The township disturbances were signal events for all South 
Africans, and the observations made above give credence to the view 
that the black employee does not see his labour as a political weapon - 
that community politics and labour matters are separate spheres.
However, a more careful study of these events during late
1976, as made by Kane-Berman, ^  for example would suggest a much less
clear distinction.______________________________________________________
1) John Kane-Berman, Soweto, Black Revolt, White Reaction, Johannesburg 
Ravan Press, 1978.
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Hostel migrants were among the active promoters of the third stay- 
away in September 1976, and the authorities themselves had to employ 
some heavy persuasion to discourage strikers.
Furthermore, calls for a boycott of white shops in 
Johannesburg were partly successful and reflected another form 
of impact on business. Kane-Berman reports that the Furniture- 
Traders Association was quite direct in blaming black "agitators" 
for the marked slow-down in the Christmas trade for 1976. It is 
meaningful to be reminded of these events, and one cannot simply 
assume that the use of labour or consumer-power as a political 
weapon is no more than a remote possibility.
Then again, other employers seem to over-inject a political 
factor into the black-white industrial and commercial interface. It 
is almost as if they see a political shadow darkening every labour 
dispute, every bus boycott and every tension in the black personnel 
situation.
These divergent points of view are reinforced by very 
divergent public views. Some black spokesmen constantly claim or 
hint at a welling of revolutionary consciousness among black people, 
including workers. Others, particularly perhaps the spokesmen for 
the authorities, tend constantly to isolate an agitator or trouble­
maker factor in what are presented as otherwise peaceful or contented 
populations.
The general situation, then, is confusing and the uncertain­
ties of some employers and the divergent views of others are under­
standable. Publicly reported events can be used to prove all view­
points. Yet, the issue of the vulnerability of the spheres of 
commerce and industry to political influence or destabilisation is 
of such importance in South Africa that it must be explored. An 
attempt will be made to take this issue a little further in this 
analysis.
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3. BROAD POLITICAL SENTIMENTS AMONG BLACKS
We have noted that events as reported in the media and 
in official documentation can prove various points of view.
Listings of strikes by black employees and their causes in the
Report of the National Manpower Commission would suggest that
politically-inspired disturbances are a tiny minority. Yet,
any observer knows that at least some labour disturbances
develop a dimension in the action which looks and sounds "political".
One has to explain why, for example, the incidence of strikes is 
relatively so high in the Eastern Cape, an area well-known for 
considerable political mobilisation.
In order to deepen the analysis a little, it is necessary 
to consider some of the results of research into black attitudes 
conducted over the past few years. A word of caution is necessary, 
however. Attitudes and opinions are not predictors of behaviour.
Any productivity expert will remind one that an attitude or 
attitudinal motivation is only one factor in a mix which results 
in employee behaviour. Rewards, constraints, opportunities, 
organisation of people and self-confidence all enter the mix.
Attitudes and opinions do, however, reflect the basic 
inclination to act in one way or another. As such they are 
important and they must be studied.
Another word of caution is that among rank-and-file black 
people (as opposed possibly to the middle class or black intelligentsia) 
attitudes as expressed in research will probably reflect caution. In 
other words, they could, in reality be more "hostile" to white interests 
than the research results would suggest. In the results which follow, 
these cautionary remarks have to be borne in mind.
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3.1 Indications of General Political Thinking
By the way of background, we may consider some general political 
sentiments among black people which have emerged from recent 
research, including work for the Buthelezi Commission. The 
results on the next pages, which are presented in very summary 
form, are evidence of a very divided consciousness among blacks.
Results in Table 1 tend to show that most blacks (in this case 
in urban and rural Natal-KwaZulu) would expect widespread support 
for anti-system activity if clear calls were made to this effect. 
Whether they are correct or not is not the issue. Their 
sentiments and perceptions are that "many" or "most" people in 
their environment would respond positively to calls for mass 
strike action or even to co-operation with insurgents.
"If a well-respected leader of African people wished to show his 
strength and he were to ask black workers to stay away from work 
for 2 weeks" (1981. n,300. Natal)
"If the M C  were to come secretly asking people to help it and work 
with it, which of the following would happen?" (1981, n. 300. Natal)
Table 1.
BLACK POLITICAL THINKING
almost all would stay away
many but not all
only a few would stay away
most people would 
many would, not al1 
a few would 
almost nobody
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The next table, Table 2 is perhaps even more dramatic. 
Majorities of people in most areas go so far as to reject 
the strong suggestion in the question asked and disagree 
with the notion that avoidance of trouble and caution is 
the most appropriate type of political response. The 
increase in this rejection of the cautious response between 
1977 and 1981 is very noteworthy.
Here again, in the second item in this table we note the very 
widespread expectation of anti-system behaviour if circumstances 
are appropriate. Over six out of ten would predict a mass- 
strike. These results all suggest a high level of political 
militancy.
Table 2
BLACK POLITICAL THINKING
"It is best for black -people to be careful in politics and not
get into trouble", (1981 n. 1400)
DISAGREE: (Witwatersrand 1977*) (30°/)
Wi twatersrand 50%
18-24 years 54%
Durban-Pietermari tzburg 61%
Rural 51%
Squatters 40%
* 1977 sample, same interviewers and sample design
"If government does not bring changes in lives of black people in
next 10 years - what from the following will definitely happen?"
(1981 n.1400)
Durban-Pmbg. Wits.
boycotts of shops 26% 37%
people leave for military 56% 51%
training
youth disturbances 57% 59%
mass strikes 65% 64%
lose hope-forget problems 2% 6%
too frightened to take action 9% 17%
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In Table 3, however, we see the signs of a dual consciousness. 
The migrant worker respondents give answers which suggest that 
they are most frustrated by specific aspects of their lives 
(money and influx control), a little less frustrated about 
"life in general", but notably less negative in their feelings 
concerning their jobs.
This does suggest a separation of the job sphere from the 
sphere of black urban conditions. Of course, wages and 
material circumstances are part of the work package so the 
distinction between the occupational and non-occupational is 
not all that clear.
Table 3
GENERAL DISCONTENT
"Feelings about life in South Africa now" those replying "unhappy" 
or "angry and impatient"
UNHAPPY/ANGRY
1 ) 1981
MIGRANT WORKERS 2) 1979 1982
Feelings-1ife-in-general 1 ) 56%
C
O
L
O
Feelings about pass laws 2) 71% 76%
Feelings about material 
circumstances 74% 76%
Feelings about your job - not asked 44%
all parts of it
In Table 4, a different dimension of political thinking emerges 
to reinforce the notion of a kind of double-consciousness among 
blacks. The sample reflected in these results were very highly 
urbanised black people, slightly better-educated than average.
On all other issues they had adopted attitudes much like those 
in Tables 1 to 3, but in these results the responses appear to 
be remarkably "balanced".
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The items in Table 4 refer not to attitudes or sentiments in 
general5 but to political strategy. We note a clear majority 
opposed to the militant or confrontationist alternative. But, 
the kind of options that draw them away from this are not fear­
ful or passive but much more deliberate and "strategic". Other 
items not included in the table suggest a very strong basic 
emphasis on organisation and unity as a first step in a political 
process.
Table 4
BLACK POLITICAL THINKING (1979 n. 150 Durban) men only
"Black leader must be -patient and work with tools he has
vs
Strong demands now"
PATIENT 61%
"Conditions for blacks getting no better, nothing to be gained by patience"
VS
"Still best for leader to be patient and plan carefully"
PATIENT-PLAN CAREFULLY 81%
"Leader must not forget freedom but first think of fobs and conditions 
of ordinary people
V S
Leader must work for freedom and power soon"
FIRST THINK OF JOBS AND CONDITIONS 69%
The implications of these patterns are, in a sense, twofold. On 
the one hand they do not suggest an urban black community of men 
ripe for disruption and loose confrontation. At the same time, 
however, the consciousness which exists, while perfectly "responsible" 
among a majority, reflects certain very serious longer-run implications.
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3.2 Migrant Worker Attitudes
What follows is of somewhat closer relevance to industry.
Over the past few years we have conducted quite a considerable 
amount of research among migrant workers. These have been 
studies of industrial migrants outside of the mining situation, 
therefore reflecting quite a wide array of employment situations. 
Here only three aspects of a wide range of findings are discussed, 
both employment-related.
Before considering the results a very general and very consistent 
finding, this being that migrant workers tend on average to be 
less "pol itical1 or less militant in their expressed attitudes 
at the moment than the better-educated permanent urban populations.
In a nation-wide sample of nearly 500 mixed migrants in 1982, we 
found some 35 percent expressing extreme dissatisfaction with job 
conditions - "anger and impatience". This was some 10 percent 
lower than the fully urban groups. (See Table 5.)
In looking for factors associated with job dissatisfaction of this 
extreme kind, we found that wage-level was the most salient 
variable of a non-political kind. In Table 5 one can see the 
variation in job dissatisfaction by income.
Table 5
FACTORS IN VERY HIGH JOB DISSATISFACTION
Sample of 480 mixed black migrant workers - nationwide - 1982
"ANGER AND IMPATIENCE IN JOB"
Sample average 35%
Over R40 per week 32%
Under R40 per week 38%
Angry-life in general 57%
Pass Laws seen as exploitation 58%
ANC seen as important for blacks 48%
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However, in Table 5 you also see that the three lower factors, 
all political perceptions, appear to have a much stronger 
relationship with extreme job-dissatisfaction even than income 
level. Certain political perceptions are associated with job- 
dissatisfaction levels which are very high and which must be a 
critical factor in the workplace.
Obviously one cannot say which causes the other. The fact that 
political attitudes and job dissatisfaction go together, however, 
is sufficient to make the point that political attitudes of black 
people, even among South Africa's workers with the least 
bargaining power - migrants - are very relevant to the workplace.
Table 6 speaks for itself. Here the migrant worker respondents 
show quite clearly that their attitudes to employers and management, 
in general terms, are cynical, critical and negative. The strongest 
positive factor is the role of capitalism in providing work (69%).
Where the migrants are highly politicised, as with those declaring 
sympathy or support for the ANC, this perception is weakened, 
dropping from a perception of nearly 70 percent to less than 50 percent.
Table 6 .
ATTITUDES TO SOUTH AFRICAN INDUSTRY
IMAGE OF CAPITALISTS 
(sample of 676 migrant workers - 1982)
"Which of the following do you think are true of most (described) 
owners of factories and work places where people like you work?"
- try to help blacks by appealing to govt. 10%
- pay as much as possible without losing profit 38%
- help blacks by providing work 69%
- work with and support govt. 78%
- replace blacks with machines 83%
- do not allow blacks to show ability 83%
- call for police help in disputes 90%
- get as much for as little pay 91%
- favour Indians and coloureds 94%
Note: strongest positive factor is providing work 69%
among ANC supporters (45%) this drops to 4 9%
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In Table 7 we see that among the migrants there are pockets of 
highly political people. One association we found is that those 
who are unhappy with the single-quarter hostel situation are very 
significantly more "political" than others. The relationship is 
undoubtedly more complex than the table shows, but suffice it to 
say that the official condition of living for migrant contract 
workers may be aggravating a very serious kind of discontent 
among those who do not like it
Table 7
MIGRANT WORKERS: RESIDENTIAL SITUATION AND POLITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS
Proportions rejecting the statement:
"It is best to be careful in politics and not risk getting into 
trouble".
Before leaving the migrant workers' account must be taken of the 
rural resources of the migrant. It is the rural resources of 
these workers which are assumed to give a "sheet-anchor" of 
security, as Phillip Mayer once described it. These rural 
resources are assumed to be the compensation for lack of rights 
and residential opportunities in the urban areas.
In Table 8 we present a profile of the resources of a very large 
sample of agricultural migrants in Natal.
It is clearly apparent that increasing land density, agricultural 
planning and even resettlement of people in the homelands have 
destroyed the basis of the rural security of a small landholding, 
crops and cattle.
DISAGREEMENT
Control group 
Private lodgers 
Shack-dwellers
Hostel-dwellers attempting to 
find other accommodation
1 4 .
Table 8
THE MIGRANT LABOUR SITUATION
RURAL RESOURCES - 860 
MIGRANTS IN NATAL
31% Have their own land
46% Have no land at all - owned or shared
45% Will have adequate land on retirement
24% Will have no land at all on retirement
35% Feel absolutely secure about keeping land 
for retirement
75% Do not own larger cattle
25% Who own cattle have average of 3 beasts
Without this security, it is inevitable that the younger 
migrant contract worker will start redirecting his 
aspirations to the city and to the workplace. Given the 
size of the migrant contract work-force, the implications 
of this for the future are serious.
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4. SPECIFIC ECONOMIC ATTITUDES AND ATTITUDES TO DISINVESTMENT
Here an array of findings of more specific interest to 
industrialists is presented. In Table 9 the answers to items on 
economic ideology are presented. These show that while huge 
majorities of blacks are in favour of "welfare capitalism", the 
urban people are far from being socialists, even in the context 
of black government control. (The items were presented in 
hypothetical terms, set in a context of a black African country, in 
order to prevent attitudes to race relations in South Africa from 
affecting responses.)
However, the migrant workers are least inclined to support
the private business ethic. This is the group which the "system"
rejects most effectively, who are most alienated from 
and industrial milieu of the city.
the commercial
ÍTable 9i-------
ÍBLACK ECONOMIC IDEOLOGY
THINK OF AFRICAN COUNTRY RULED
BY AFRICANS TO THE NORTH.. •
DURBAN MIGRANT
1981 1982
Business should be owned by private 
black-men working hard 77% 52%
OR
Business owned by black government 2 2 % 48%
Factories managed by black elected govt. 2 5 % 32%
Factories managed by private businessmen 
of any race 5 8 % 38%
Factories managed by businessmen and 
workers 17% 31%
Govt, which is mainly concerned with care 
of poor, unemployed OJ 59%
OR
Govt, mainly concerned with growth, with 
many wealthy people and many jobs 26% 39%
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Table 10 shows what has been noted in numerous other studies. 
The relationship between existing wage levels and the levels aspired 
to is much the same as it is among blue-collar employees of other 
groups and in Europe. In this and in other studies it is difficult 
to find evidence of totally unrealistic wage expectations among our 
black employee respondents. The picture emerging from wage negotia­
tions in some cases may be different, but there the strategy is 
inevitably to maximise demands.
Table 10
BLACK VIEWS ON WAGES AND REWARDS
1982 migrant worker sample
i
;
1
1
676
B L U E  C O L L A R  
Weekly wage R44 1 . 0
What migrants feel it should be 
in relation to work and skills R75 1.7
What it should be to buy the 
things they desire R105 2.4
M O N T H L Y  P A I D  
Monthly salary Ri 54
I
1 .0
What it should be in relation 
to work and skills R254 1.7
What it should be to buy the 
things they desire R318 2.1
1981 General sample desired wage/salary of 3 times existing wage j
Table 11 goes back to some evidence from the Buthelezi 
Commission. Whatever black employees may do in practice, their 
sentiments today are for wage equality - rather than for wage reform. 
Compared with earlier studies conducted a decade ago by this author, 
these results reflect a very meaningful shift.
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Table 11
WAGE EQUALITY
1981 Natal-KwaZulu Sample n.300
"If you were working with a white person doing the same work
- white R300 pm
- you R250 pm"
1 What would you prefer - you get R50 
increase so both get R300 8 8%
You and white get increase at R75 pm. 
White R375 and you R325 12%
2 What would you prefer?
Black and white same salary but all getting 
small increases 90%
OR
Black and white unequal for a time but 
everyone getting large regular increases 10%
Table 12 is drawn from preliminary results of a study being 
made of the "pensions disturbances" which recently swept Natal and 
the Eastern Cape. The low levels of trust in certain crucial public 
and private institutions, as well as in employers, reveals the 
extreme vulnerability of the legitimacy of our production system.
Very broadly, effective communication with the black working class 
is impossible with such low levels of trust in major institutions 
which affect his working life.
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Table 12 
T R U S T
BLACK FACTORY WORKERS - DURBAN
PROPORTIONS EXPRESSING FULL 
TRUST IN ORGANISATIONS
Banks 75%
Trade union 48%
KwaZulu Govt. 44%
Insurance Co. 35%
White employers 29%
Pension funds 29%
White Govt. 15%
C 0 M M E R C E ?
Table 13 once again, reveals the pragmatism of blacks on 
economic issues, despite all the frustrations and the political 
consciousness revealed in results presented above. There was 
relatively little support in the Durban region for a disinvestment 
or boycott strategy, in 1979 at any rate
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Table 13
ATTITUDES TO SOUTH AFRICAN INDUSTRY
EXTERNAL INVESTMENT
(Study of 150 Africans, Durban, 1979)
1 "Overseas companies that build factories in South Africa"
- help African people to progress 29%
- help the whites 23%
- help the South African government 34%
- help all 10%
- help Africans - Buthelezi supporters 36%
- 35 years plus 38%
2 "Some people say that overseas companies must stop buying
South African goods and stop sending money to build factories
so as to frighten S.A. government....Others say that they
should continue because it makes jobs for all people in S.A."
- stop (boycott) 20%
- continue trading/investing 75%
- don’t know 5%
Pro-Boycott - males 26%
- 16-34 years 23%
- black consciousness 33%
As regards attitudes among black workers to the functions of 
trade unions one finds evidence of a quite considerable separation of 
issues. In 1981, among a sample of roughly 700 blacks nationwide, an 
open question was asked about "Whiat trade unions can do for blacks?" 
Many of the very militant political responses refered to in earlier 
tables were drawn from this sample of 700, which was part of the 
sample of subjects interviewed in the study conducted for the 
Buthelezi Commission. In spontaneous response to this question, 
however, less than 5 percent of the black respondents mentioned a 
political function or goal for trade unions.
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5. DRAWING THE EVIDENCE TOGETHER
Very briefly, what these results show is that industry 
and commerce is in a very ambiguous situation vis-a-vis blacks 
and black political thinking. In the results which have been 
described there is very clear evidence of a dual consciousness 
among blacks. On the one hand they are highly political, 
highly critical of capitalism and its performance, and also 
evince very low levels of trust in crucial organisations and 
institutions responsible for communication, welfare and services.
On the other hand, however, the mass of the black rank-and- 
file is not inclined to reject the system on grounds of any kind of 
popular socialist ideology. The preceptions of strategy among 
blacks also seem to be constrained by very pragmatic considerations 
and what seems like a careful assessment of the costs of destabilisa­
tion of industry. There is very little evidence of a self­
consciously political view of the trade union movement.
Of note is the fact that the very substantial migrant 
contract labour force is least inclined to give basic ideological 
support to the free-market system. Their exclusion from the core 
of urban benefits and services is relevant here. Influx control 
appears to be maintaining or creating a considerable ideological 
distance between the values of capitalism and a substantial proportion 
of its labour. This labour force is also particularly vulnerable 
to instability because its rural security appears to be crumbling 
very rapidly.
Broadly, then, the situation seems to be "in the balance", 
perhaps in rather delicate balance. The need for careful ongoing 
study of the situation is crucial.
6 . ADDITIONAL BROADER CONCLUSIONS
This situation of what seems to be a delicate balance is 
cause for considerable concern if looked at very carefully. On 
the one hand the divided consciousness among blacks must be due 
in some measure to the lack of an organised political leadership 
throughout the country. (The presence of Inkatha in KwaZulu- 
Natal makes that region somewhat of an exception.) If a 
more consistent political leadership were to emerge and organise 
effectively at grass-roots level then at least some of the 
"dualism" in black political thinking is likely to diminish.
The effects are unlikely to make blacks more conservative, as it 
were, but the effective outcomes are impossible to predict.
Some people may hope for a continuation of the present 
position, but there are disadvantages in the present situation for 
industry. The lack of a political leadership means that there 
are no strong mediating figures who could negotiate to bring 
stability in times of widespread unrest. A good example of 
this could be seen in the "pensions strikes" which took on 
fairly serious proportions and lasted longer than they might 
otherwise have done because of no mediating figures of high 
credibility. (In this instance Chief Butheiezi did not intervene 
in any way, making the Natal situation what is would theoretically 
have been in the rest of the country had the strikes occurred there.)
There are thus some very negative aspects to the 
uncertainties in black politics.
A final question has to be asked? How long is the divided 
consciousness likely to continue, with or without more directive 
political leadership? Any clear answer is, of course, impossible 
to provide. One possible pointer is worth considering, however.
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From a variety of different sponsored studies undertaken 
among industrial labour forces for specific companies it would seem 
that some 55 to 50 percent of unskilled and semi-skilled workers 
are generally satisfied in their job situations. The figure 
would seem to be slightly higher among the semi-skilled than among 
the unskilled groups, as one would expect, but the general pattern 
of a balance of satisfactions over dissatisfactions seems to be 
fairly typical. This of course does not mean that there are 
not very sharp specific grievances - one is talking here of an over­
all sentiment. Given the centrality of the job in the working- 
class black's life, this balance of job satisfactions over dis­
satisfactions is probably an important stabilising factor in the 
urban-industrial situation.
There is, however, one category of employees which seems to 
show a consistently more negative pattern of job-attitude - the 
better-educated workers within the lower job-grades. In general 
they can be as much as half less-satisfied than the average 
employee in a grade. The implications of this might be that 
as general educational levels improve and more and more better- 
educated workers feel trapped at low levels of work in industry, 
the positive balance could shift to the negative.
This kind of pattern places a great deal of responsibility 
on industry to make sure that everything is done to open channels of 
advancement for this category of employees in industry, with in­
company training schemes and even job enrichment programmes where 
possible. Obviously the quality of supervision must also improve.
In the future industry will have to acquaint itself much 
more fully with the balance of factors which operate in the black 
labour force, and act creatively to protect what basic stability 
exists in the system.
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